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STATE RESOURCE SOVEREIGNTY IN A POST-
SPORHASE WORLD: THE HUECO BOLSON
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STATE RESOURCE SOVEREIGNTY IN A
POST-SPORHASE WORLD: THE CASE OF
THE HUECO BOLSON
I. The Resource Conflict: The Hueco Bolson is an
interstate aquifer shared by New Mexico and Texas
and each states seeks to control its sustained
yield. The current, on-going conflict between the
two states is a modern twist on the classic
interstate allocation problem: a faster growing
downstream state claims a disproportionate share of
the interstate "stream" against the slower growing
upstream state. The twist is that El Paso seeks to
perfect a water right under New Mexico law, but
ultimately relies neither on the grace of New Mexico
or the reciprocal enforcement of interstate
priorities. Instead, Texas asserts that New Mexico
has a federal constitutional duty to approve
applications for out of state groundwater
appropriations.
II. The Allocation Problem: El Paso claims that it will
have a population of 2,100,000 by 2080 and that it
will require 300,000 acre feet per year to serve
this population. El Paso has 80% of the population
in the region, which it defines as the reach of the
Rio Grande from Caballo Reservoir in New Mexico to
r
Fort Quitman on the Texas-Mexico border. New Mexico
uses the water primarily for irrigated agriculture.
A. Sources of El Paso's Existing Supplies: El Paso
draws most of its water from the Texas side of
the Hueco Bolson aquifer, 90% of which is owned
by the United States, and is mining it. The
city estimates that it has 10,000,000 acre feet
in its water account including Fort Bliss and
that it will be depleted in 30 to 50 years. The
city relies on groundwater because the Rio
Grande treaty only apportioned water for
agricultural use and the city initially did not
contract with the Bureau of Reclamation for a
share of the stream flow appropriated by the
Bureau to construct Elephant Butte dam in New
Mexico.	 See Reynolds and Mutz, Water
Deliveries Under the Rio Grande Compact, 14
Nat. Res. J. 201 (1974). Subsequently, the
city did contract with the Bureau for an
allocation of water for land within the city
limits and for wild or surplus irrigation
water. Day, Urban Water Management of an
International River: The Case of El Paso-
Juarez, 15 Natural Resources L. J. 453 (1975).
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B. Conservation: Until the early 1970s, El Paso
offered a 20% discount for summer use of water
to encourage a humid landscape in an arid
environment. The city is now implementing
various conservation measures, but argues that
it has exhausted its water conservation
options.
C. Further References:
Schenkkan, The El Paso Case:
Interstate Issues in Groundwater
Regulation, Water Law Conference
Proceedings (University of Texas
School of Law 1985).
I. Clark, Water in New Mexico: A
History Of Its Management• and
Use (1987).
III. The Law of Interstate Allocation: States have a
duty to share interstate rivers, but the extent of
sharing remains undefined because the "law" of
interstate sharing in a mix of Supreme Court rules,
compacts and legislation.
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1. Pair is Fair? A state is entitled to a fair
share of an interstate watercourse, which
presumptively includes aquifers. Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). The law of
equitable apportionment does not give adequate
protection to unallocated water because prior
uses are entitled to preference to protect
existing economies. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922).
2. Locking In Future Supplies: A state may
reserve a share and an interstate watercourse
for future use by an interstate compact, or by
a congressional apportionment. Cf. ETSI v.
Missouri,	 U.S.	 (1988).	 Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See Note,
New Mexico Continues to Study Water Embargo
Measures: A Reply to the State Water Law
Study, 16 Texas Tech. L. Rev. 939 (1985).
3. Dormant Commerce Clause Duties: A state may
have a duty to share its portion of an inter-
state aquifer because the dormant commerce
clause prohibits state protectionism.
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.
941 (1982).
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IV. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 
(1982): Judicial Deregulation of State Permit 
Systems: The Supreme Court decision in this case is
one of the most important water decisions rendered
by the Court because the application of the dormant
commerce clause to state water allocation regimes
undermines all of the assumptions upon which state
allocation institutions have been premised.
A. Nebraska's Unconstitutional Statute: The
statute prohibited withdrawals for out of
state groundwater use unless the host state
granted reciprocal export privileges, which
Colorado did not in part to conserve its share
of the Ogallala aquifer. Thompson v. Colorado
Groundwater Commission, 575 P.2d 372 (Colo.
1978).
B. Prior case law: The Supreme Court originally
held that state resource conservation measures
were immune from the dormant commerce clause.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S.
349 (1908) held that export bans did not
violate the dormant commerce clause. The
cases were always wrong because conservation
is simply the application of the state's
5
police power to property. Subsequent cases
eroded McCarter, West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F. Supp. 828 (W. D. Tex.), summarily
aff'd, 385 U.S. 35 (1966), and thus Sporhase 
was not a surprise.
C. Holding: The Nebraska statute was
unconstitutional because it was not an even-
handed conservation statute and the state
failed to demonstrate a close fit between the
reciprocity requirement and the conservation
of groundwater.
D. Did the Court Really Mean What it Held? The
"Demonstrably Arid State" Exception: Justice
Stevens recognized both the tradition and
continued importance of state allocation
primacy and suggested that some states could
demonstrate a relationship between export bans
and conservation.	 Cf. Maine v. Taylor,
U.S.	 (1986).
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V. The Higher Avoidance of Sporhase: A broad reading
of case prevents a state from controlling the
future use of unappropriated water. Not surpris-
ingly, the western states have sought to limit the
holding and to reconcile the holding with the
Court's traditional deference to state allocation
primacy. Commentators have suggested the following
theories to avoid the invalidation of state
allocation schemes that prefer in to out of stat e
users.
A. The "Equitable Apportionment Exception." See
Trelease, State Water Law and State Lines:
Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 347 (1985). and U Hon, The El Paso Case:
Reconciling Sporhase and Verme o, 23 Nat. Res.
J. ix (1983).
B. Water Marketing: Water marketing is premised
on both legal and economic assumptions.
1. The Supreme Court has held that the
dormant commerce clause does not apply
when the state is a market participant,
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980), as opposed to a regulator.
South-Central Timber Development Co.,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). See
generally Anson & Shenkkan, Federalism,
the Dormant Commerce Clause and State-
Owned Resources, 59 Texas L. Rev. 71
(1,80) and Rodgers, Limits on State
Activity in the Interstate Water Market,
21 Land 6 Water L. Rev. 357 (1986)
2: The economic assumptions are that water
should be treated like oil and that there
is an inter-state market for water.
C.
	
	 State Allocation Primary Reborn: Traditional
sovereignty requires judicial deference to
state "reservations." Trelease, Interstate
Use of Water - "Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike &
Vermejo," 22 Land & Water L. Rev. 315, 321
(1987) has set forth an elaborate argument
that unappropriated water is still subject to
state control:
Sporhase is right and El Paso is wrong.
States can live with Sporhase's ruling
that a state cannot tell its citizens
that they cannot sell out of state when
it permits them to sell within the state-.
This applies to both sales of water and
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sales of water rights.	 A state cannot
expect to prevent the interstate sale of
water rights to "preserve the
neighborhood" any more than it could
prevent a steel mill from closing in a
factory town or dictate the way of life
to its rural inhabitants. On the other
hand, the states cannot live with El
Paso. El Paso would require a state to
sit by and see other states deprive its
people of future opportunities for growth
and development, while preserving only
"noneconomic" water for the public health
and safety of stagnating communities.
Without overruling Sporhase, but with
some clarifications with regard to
shortages and explanations of legitimate
local interests, much water might be
saved within states on a territorial-
opportunity cost theory, discussed later,
without freezing out neighboring cities.
Neighboring cities might be put to more
expense either because they have to pay
the opportunity costs or because they
must available, though more expensive,
source in their own state. The remainder
of this article will examine these
issues.
VI. The Broader Question: How Should Interstate 
Groundwater Be Allocated. The Huceo Bolson
controversy raises all the institutional issues of
interstate allocation.
A. State Administrative Allocation Within state 
Boundaries. This is the status quo but it
presumptively offends the national common
market ideal upon Sporhase is premised.
B. Equitable Apportionment. This allocation
solution is premised on the idea that
interstate resources should be shared among
common states. See Utton, In Search of An
Integrating Principle For Interstate Water
Law; Regulation versus The Market Palace, 25
Natural Resources J. 985 (1985).
3. Market Allocation. The market recognizes no
borders or willing buyers and sellers. The
market further tends to discount claims that
the value of a resource will rise over time
1 0
and thus should be reserved for future use.
a. Resource economists argue that the
function of the law should be to define
exclusive property rights to the maximum
extent possible to facilitate transfers.
See Anderson, in T. Anderson, Water
Rights Scare Resource Allocation,
Bureaucracy, and the Environment (1983).
b. The Dormant Commerce Clause is a market
facilitating doctrine because it ignores
state boundaries. Varat, state Citizen-
ship and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 487 (1981).
D. State Allocation Through Legislative Bargains 
with Interstate Appropriators. One function
of the dormant commerce clause is to cure
failures in the political process. There is
no need to invalidate state legislative
processes open to out-of-state interests. See
Tarlock, So It's Not "Ours", Why Can't We
Still Keep It? A First Look at Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 23 Land & Water L. Rev. 137 (1983)
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VII. State Law: "Equitable apportionment" is difficult
because the two state had different groundwater
regimes and have historically placed different
values on conservation.
A. Texas: Texas follows the absolute ownership
rule of groundwater. Groundwater is the
property of the overlying land owner and is
subject to capture, City of Sherman v. Public
Utilities Commission of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681
(Tex. 1983). There are minimal restrictions on
its use:
1. Negligent pumping. Fr iend swood
Development Co. v. Smith Southwest
Industries, Inc., 576 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.
1978).
2. Critical areas may be designated but the
state relies on education and the
voluntary	 adoption of	 conservation
technologies.
B. New Mexico: New Mexico was the first state to
conserve groundwater by applying the doctrine
of prior appropriation. New Mexico enacted a
groundwater appropriation statute in response
12
to pressure from the Federal Land Bank which
refused to make loans in the Pecos Valley
because artesian pressure had steadily
declined since settlement. Yeo v. Tweedy, 34
N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929) and State ex rel.
Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007
(1950).
1. New Mexico has firmed up groundwater
rights by (1) defining the allowable
extent of interference with other wells,
(2) by limiting the "right to lift", and
(3) by allowing mining of designated
aquifers. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77
N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966). See
generally Grant, Reasonable Ground-water
pumping Under the Appropriation Doctrine:
The Law and Underlying Economic Goals.
2. Ground and surface water rights are
coordinated through the protection of
prior rights in an interconnected source.
Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379
P.2d 73 (1962).
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VIII.New Mexico's Response Legal Response: New Mexico
has refused to allow El Paso's appropriations or to
bargain with the city. Instead, it has adapted
public interest review to a post-Sporhase world.
A. New Mexico initially applied its anti-export
state and defended it on the ground that it
needed the water for a long-term statewide
water shortage, but this "arid state" defense
dried up. El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp.
379 (D.N.M. 1983) rejected the defense because
water was just another commodity: "Outside of
fulfilling human survival needs, water is an
economic resource."
B. New Mexico enacted the following statute: N.M.
Stat. 72-128-1
[A]. The state of New Mexico has long
recognized the importance of the conservation
of its public waters and the necessity to
maintain adequate water supplies for the
state's water requirements. The state of New
14
Mexico also recognizes that under appropriate
conditions the out-of-state transportation and
use of its public waters is not in conflict
with the public welfare of its citizens or the
conservation of its waters.
[B]. Any person, firm or corporation or any
other entity intending to withdraw water from
any surface or underground water source in the
state of New Mexico and transport it for use
outside the state or to change the place or
purpose of a water right from a place in New
Mexico to a place out of that state shall
apply to the state engineer for a permit to do
so. Upon the filing of an application, the
state engineer shall cause to be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
county in which the well will be located or
the stream system from which the surface water
will be taken, at least once a week for three
consecutive weeks, a notice that the
application has been filed and that objections
to the granting of the application may be
filed within ten days after the last
publication of the notice. Any person, firm
or corporation or other entity objecting that
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the granting of the application would impair
or be detrimental to the objector's water
right shall have standing to file object-ions
or protests. Any person, firm or corporation
or other entity objecting that the granting of
the application will be contrary to the
conservation of water within the state or
detrimental to the public welfare of the state
and showing that the objector will be
substantially and specifically affected by the
granting of the application shall have
standing to file objections or objections.
Provided, however, that the state of New
Mexico or any of its branches, agencies,
departments, boards, instrumentalities or
institutions shall have standing to file
objections or protests. The state engineer
shall accept for filing and act upon all
applications filed under this section in
accordance with the provision of this section.
The state engineer shall require notice of the
application and shall thereafter proceed to
consider the application in accordance with
existing administrative law and procedure
governing the appropriation of surface or
ground water.
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[C]. In order to approve an application under
this act, the state engineer must find that
the applicant's withdrawal and transportation
of water for use outside the state would not
impair existing water rights, is not contrary
to the conservation of water within the state
and is not otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare of the citizens of New Mexico.
[D]. In acting upon an application under this
act, the state engineer shall consider, but
not be limited to, the following factors:
(1) the supply of water available to the
state of New Mexico;
(2) water demands of the state of New
Mexico;
(3) whether there are water shortages
within the state of New Mexico;
(4) whether the water that is the subject
of the application could feasibly be
transported to alleviate water shortages
in the state of New Mexico;
(5) the supply and sources of water
available to the applicant in the state
where the applicant intends to use the
17
water, and;
(6) the demands placed on the applicant's
supply in the state where the applicant
intends to use the water.
[E]. By filing an application to withdraw and
transport waters for use outside the state the
applicant shall submit to and comply with the
laws of the state of New Mexico governing the
appropriation and use of water.
[F]. The state engineer is empowered to
condition the permit to insure that the use of
water in another state is subject to the same
regulations and restrictions that may be
imposed upon water use in the state of New
Mexico.
[G]. Upon approval of the application, the
applicant shall designate an agent in New
Mexico for reception of service of process and
other legal notices.
D. El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M.
1984) rejected three challenges to the statute
but upheld a fourth:
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1. Conservation with in the state is not a
per prohibition against out of state
export.
2. Conservation and public welfare are
meaningful standards for in-state users
in light of the long tradition of public
interest review.
3. Concern for the public welfare of the
citizens of New Mexico is not
intrinsically discriminatory. [597 F.
Supp. at 694]: A state may favor its own
citizens in times and places of shortage.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-957, 102 S. Ct.
at 3464-3465. Of course, this does not
mean that a state may limit or bar
exports simply because it anticipates
that one day there will not be enough
water to meet all future uses. Even some
of the most water-abundant states predict
shortages at some future date. The
preference envisioned by the Supreme
Court must be limited to the times and
places where its exercise would not place
unreasonable	 burdens	 on	 interstate
19
commerce relative to the local benefits
it produces.
On the other hand, it would be
unreasonable to require a state to wait
until it is in the midst of a dire
shortage before it can prefer its own
citizen's use of the available water over
out-of-state usage. A limited preference
which could not be exercised until water
resources were almost depleted would be
no preference at all. If the limited
preference is to be meaningful the states
must be permitted to prefer local usage
while there is still water to conserve.
The proximity in time of a projected
shortage, the certainty that it will
occur, its predicted severity, and
whether alternative measures could
prevent or alleviate the shortage are all
factors which must be weighed when
balancing the total interests served by
the exercise of a preference against the
burdens it places on interstate commerce.
New Mexico need not wait until the
appropriate time and place of shortage
arises to enact a statute limiting
20
exports. The State may enact a law to
provide for future contingencies. If
facially valid, any constitutional attack
on such a statute for violation of the
Commerce	 Clause	 must	 await	 its
application.
Other factors which inform the
determination	 whether	 a	 state's
preference	 for	 its	 own	 citizens
reasonably or unreasonably burdens
interstate commerce are the degree to
which the state claims public ownership
of ground water and whether the
availability of the water is in part the
result of the state's conservation
efforts. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-957,
102 S. Ct. at 464-3465. These factors,
as with those relating to the extent of
shortages	 and	 the	 public	 welfare
interests being protected, cannot be
evaluated in a vacuum. Only when the
defendants exercise a preference for the
citizens of New Mexico can the local
benefits from the preference be weighed
against	 the	 resulting	 burden	 on
interstate commerce.
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4. The consideration of conservation and
public welfare for only out of state
transfers is facially discriminatory
because it requires interstate commerce
to shoulder the entire burden of
conservation.
E. Moses Speaks But the Waters Do Not Divide: In
the Matter of the Applications of the City of
El Paso, Texas Nos. LRG-92 through LRG-357 and
HU-12 through HU-71 found that "no water
rights in New Mexico are needed by El Paso for
a water development plan or to protect its
water supply for reasonably projected needs
within 40 years . .
1. El Paso will require 163, 000 acre feet
by 2020 and has 167,420 acre feet
available from the Hueco Bolson and
Canutillo well fields and Rio Grande
surface diversions.
2. Rio Grande Water is the most practical
alternative source.
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3. If the numbers are wrong, El Paso can
condemn the necessary appropriative
rights.
IX. New Mexico's Planning Response: Along with
Montana, New MExico have taken the most aggressive
and thoughtful to Sporhase.
A. The state funded a study of water needs and
water marketing. Water Law Study Committee,
Report to Governor Toney Anaya and the
Legislative Council Pursuant to Laws 1983,
Chapter 98, reprinted as Water Law Study
Committee, The Impact of recent Court
Decisions Concerning water and Interstate
Commerce on Water Resources of the State of
New Mexico, 24 Nat. Resources J. 689 (1984).
B. A subsequent study, State Appropriation of
Unappropriated Groundwater: A Strategy for
Insuring New Mexico's Water Future (New Mexico
Resources Research Institute and University of
New Mexico, 1986) recommended:
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1. State Appropriation of groundwater or 
purchase of groundwater rights could 
guarantee future long-term supplies.
The state may elect to appropriate
a substantial amount of groundwater where
available supplies exist, using a time
horizon for development of 80-100 years.
It would need to, concomitant with its
application to appropriate water, develop
a long-term plan for the use and
development of the water resource and
ultimately make the water available to
actual water users for beneficial use.
The most significant result of this
strategy would be securing water supplies
for future needs. In some areas of the
state, the same result could be achieved
through purchase by the state of existing
rights with a lease-back arrangement to
the owner until the owner no longer needs
the rights. For example, in many areas
of the state, the maximum depth to which
a farmer can pump and still remain
profitable is 230 to 250 feet. There
may, however, be substantial amounts of
water below that depth that could be put
24
to other commercial uses in the future.
Therefore, as noted above, in those areas
of the state, the state may wish to act
now to begin to purchase rights and give
the farmer a lease-back (in a sense,
purchase "water futures") so that the
balance of the aquifer is available over
the long term if and when the financial
base of these agricultural communities
changes to other types of industries.
2.	 State Appropriation or purchase of 
groundwater may allow short-term
marketing of water interstate to support
New Mexico water projects.
The state may also wish to
appropriate water in areas where the best
market, at least in the near term, is out
of state. Since water is an asset that
can bring a high lease price and since
the state needs revenues to develop other
water projects throughout the state,
leasing a portion of its water rights for
use out-of-state or sale of water in bulk
to out-of-state users could provide a
source of badly needed revenues for areas
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of the state that need substantial funds
to develop public supplies. The benefit
of this solution is that it allows New
Mexico to capture revenue from an asset
that otherwise is made available for free
on the interstate market under the
Sporhase decision. It would, of course,
have to be understood that when the water
is needed in New Mexico, the out-of-state
use would end.
3. State Appropriation or purchase of 
groundwater could permit the state to 
develop and coordinate water transfer 
projects.
There will be areas of the state
that, notwithstanding full use of water
conservation technologies, may need to
import water from other sources in New
Mexico. This type of project could
conceivably create conflict between the
source area and the area to which the
water is being transported. The only
entity with jurisdiction over both areas
is the state. The state, as owner, could
26
appropriate water in one area of the
state for use in another while ensuring
that: (1) the area from which the surplus
water is taken is fully compensated for
it, and (2) the area into which the water
is being imported has met acceptable
water conservation standards in advance.
If such water transfers projects are left
exclusively to regional development,
experience in other states teaches us
that intrastate water conflicts can
develop that waste time and the limited
economic resources of the state.
4.	 State Appropriation or purchase of
groundwater could permit the state to
develop and coordinate water importation
projects where such plans are
economically and hydrologically feasible.
The may be many areas of the state
where the most rational source of a long
term water supply is an out-of-state
source that is proximate to a New Mexico
community and distant from any water
needs in a neighboring state. If the
neighboring state has developed the water
27
supply, the choice may be to purchase the
water from that state. If the
neighboring state has not developed these
supplies, and it is not inconsistent with
the public welfare of that state, then
New Mexico may seek to develop the water
supply and make it available not only for
New Mexico users, but also for users in
the other state.
X	 Conclusion: What are the lessons of El Paso?
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